The latest New Yorker is running a scary story on just how close India and Pakistan got to war in 2002 after the Dec. 13, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament. ‘The Stand-Off’ is written by Steve Coll, author of Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden. It’s not online yet, but here’s a related interview. Some of the eyebrow-raising details:
- Pakistani nuclear scientists have admitted to meeting with bin Laden; it’s not clear if it was during bin Laden’s U.S.-backed Afghan war phase or afterwards
- The Parliament attackers had a car bomb big enough to kill most of the Indian Parliament. The MPs escaped only by chance, because the Vice Presidential motorcade happened to be blocking the Parliament entrance and the car bomb couldn’t get inside.
- The U.S. pressured India to back off from retaliating so that Pakistan could supply troops to police the Afghanistan border
- The U.S. turned down basing rights offered by India during the Afghanistan bombing so as not to offend Pakistan
- Both countries feel betrayed by the U.S. after the 2002 border standoff: India because Musharraf has reduced but not stopped jihadi groups, and Pakistan because of warming U.S.-India ties
- Disappointed by the political restraint in 2002, the Indian military has adopted a ‘cold start’ doctrine, a rapid reaction plan that kicks in before the U.S. and Britain start applying pressure; this increases the risk of war
- American diplomats think India has an imprecise understanding of what would trigger nuclear escalation; it’s in Pakistan’s interest to convey the impression that that threshold is low
- American analysts think that, like most countries, Pakistan would actually use its nukes if it felt its national survival were threatened
- Under the U.S. interpretation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it’s illegal to give nuke safety tech like PALs (coded controllers) to India and Pakistan, even though they reduce the chance of accidental launch
- The Pakistani military says it follows standard procedures to secure its nukes in central locations; they’re most vulnerable to being hijacked once deployed in the field
- American analysts estimate both countries have around 100 nukes, and Israel twice that
The Indians and the Pakistanis have long experience with the West or with Russia coming into their disputes, and they’ve become quite sophisticated… the Indians used American diplomacy to try to coerce Pakistan into reducing its support for jihadi groups. Equally, the Pakistanis used the Americans to put pressure on India to resolve the underlying problem of Kashmir, and also tried to make themselves indispensable to the Americans in Afghanistan. So there was a kind of a multiple-level chess game going on… both India and Pakistan felt quite emotional about these issues even as they were manipulating the chessboard…The Pakistanis, under Musharraf… abandoned their support for the Taliban and they have put some pressure on domestic radical groups. However, Musharraf has not done everything possible to constrain the Kashmiri groups… most outside analysts believe that the Pakistani Army is quietly continuing to aid some of them. I think the generals see Kashmir as a case apart, as something different from the broader war on terrorism, or, at least, as a case that’s full of exceptions from their point of view, and the United States has not fully challenged that view…
Some people on both sides of the border felt that… the experience of having come so close to war… had an effect similar to that of the Cuban missile crisis… and would lead to a new period of restraint… At the same time, there’s evidence that some… learned the wrong lessons… For instance, the Indian military… came away with the lesson that they need to be able to attack quickly after a terrorist event, so they don’t create the time for outside powers to intervene diplomatically. They have started to recommend a new military doctrine called “cold start,” which would allow them to attack across the Pakistan border within days. [Link]
This story blows my mind.
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Even in the U.S., some parts of the nuke security regime are as weak as a $2 bike lock: In the 1960’s, the [PAL] combination locks were installed on the Minuteman ICBMs. However, the Strategic Air Command in Omaha worried that in case of need the codes won’t be available, so they quietly decided to set them to 00000000; checking this combination was even present on the launch checklists. This was not changed until 1977. [Link] |
War is hell, and hell on the economy, but the alternative is worse. It’s likely true that jihadi groups are trying to bait India and Pakistan into war to boost their own recruiting and fundraising. But no federal government can afford not to respond to an attack on the government seat. The first attack is a test. If you don’t respond, you’re marked as weak and you become prey. Since 12/13, there have been the Bangalore campus attack, the Delhi market bombs, the Ayodhya attack and the Army family massacre in Kashmir. It’s only due to luck and lack of jetliners that the death tolls have been low relative to 9/11.
There needed to be an unequivocal strike on the jihadi groups behind 12/13 other than just saber-rattling. It should have been a special forces operation, a missile attack or an air raid on jihadi camps in Kashmir; to prevent escalation, no ground troops and not on the Pakistani mainland. Going forward, the two militaries need to figure out a bright line on nuclear escalation so as to stay on the right side.
And, once again, our short-sighted foreign policy is putting Americans in danger. Our illogical ban on exporting safety technology need to be waived when the recipients already possess nukes. The U.S.’ military alliance with Pakistan is tighter than that with India. And yet this ally has sold nuke tech to North Korea, Iran, Libya, and has some Islamist members in the military who continue to support terrorist groups and the Taliban. Our long-standing preference for military dictatorships, privately-owned companies if you will, is now in conflict with nuclear blowback. Chances are that a large nuke set off in a U.S. city, god forbid, will have passed through the hands of the irresponsible Pakistani military.
