Rarely does an article or blog post occupy my thoughts for very long, but Vinod’s exceptional entry regarding an anti-“Islamist” manifesto is such an exception. The manifesto, you will recall, featured several prominent signatories, including Salman Rushdie, and argued in principle that the struggle against Islamism will not be won by arms, but in the ideological field.

When Sajit and I wrote for The Satya Circle, I asked in an essay, “is the war on terror more than a battle between arms and men, but between mentalities and worldviews as well?”

[T]he fact remains there is a large and growing disparity between the American worldview and that of other nations and cultures…. The disparity in understanding between America and other nations and cultures might serve as America’s biggest foe, not any military regime or any set of terrorist groups…. [T]he American worldview must expand in order to understand, yet by no means accept, the ideology and reasoning of the Taliban and others sharing its hatred, even if what the Taliban practices and preaches is beyond any reasonable sense of morality…. Destroying Al Qaeda and punishing those who sponsor, harbor, or otherwise encourage terrorism is not sufficient and cannot make the country truly safer or without real threat…. Unless and until America engages in such serious introspection and in the enterprise of comprehending the subjective worldview of the Islamic fundamentalists and others, America cannot take real long-term, proactive steps towards preventing another attack. [Link]

Now, this was written before the Iraq war. Since then, we have engaged in said war, arguably tortured, humiliated, and denied due process to Muslim detainees — reports of which have had the effect of further aggravating Iraqis and others, and contributing to the will that legitimizes and effectuates acts of terrorism.

Indeed, President Bush himself said yesterday:

[W]e cannot let the fact that America has not been attacked since September the 11th lull us into the illusion that the terrorist threat has disappeared. We still face dangerous enemies. The terrorists haven’t lost the will or the ability to kill innocent folks. [Link]

This extant will has led some to argue that the United States is actually losing the war on terror: killing suspected or prospective terrorists is insufficient and counterproductive, it is said, if doing so further inflames terrorist groups and their supporters. Certain U.S. policy is, in other words, a recruitment device. And it would be a mistake to assume that only fundamentalists or the impoverished are signing up; those interested in harming the United States for its actions include the educated and advantaged (see, e.g., “UNC Attack Suspect Wanted to Punish Gov’t”).

The interesting question is not whether the arms/men vs. will framework is an advantageous one, but how the concept of “winning the war of ideas” can be implemented into tangible policy.

There are, I hope, many plausible answers. I’d like to share just one with you today. As a graduate student, I wrote a brief paper arguing that the administration should create a Brain Trust of academics, policy wonks, and others who are intimately knowledgeable of and interested in the welfare, mentality, and condition of Islam and Islamic nations. Any potential American policy related to those people, nations, and the “war on terror” could then be “run by” this group of individuals to determine what, if any, counterproductive effect the policy would have related to the war effort. Rather than have reactions to American policy manifest itself in riots and protests in the streets (or worse), the Brain Trust would serve as an internal advisory panel that could vet not only the spin, but the substance of related American policy to minimize, control, or prevent negative consequences of the policy. If the nation can create a Department of Homeland Security, then why not this group?

To be sure, there are several problems with this idea. The first is a pragmatic one dealing with resources: America has had trouble recruiting translators, let alone talented policy advisors. The second is a more political one: the Republicans were successful in portraying John Kerry and John Edwards as “soft” on war and as inhabitants of a “pre-9/11 world.” The question for American voters, as presented by the GOP, was straightforward: who would you rather have fighting Osama (Needick), Kerry/Edwards (Screech Powers) or Bush/Cheney (A.C. Slater)? Arguing for this Brain Trust or any quasi-diplomatic solution may be thought of as a weak and therefore politically unviable strategy.

In any case, there are encouraging signs, such as the appointment of Karen Hughes to serve as Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. But, this appears to be a band-aid on what is otherwise an extremely complex and important part of America’s war effort — one that requires substantive solutions, not just spin.

One can only hope that the nation does more to win the war of ideas….