A newly declassified Indian navy investigation says that the only Indian naval vessel ever sunk by an enemy submarine was inadequately protected, and the Indian navy initiated an immediate cover-up. The Pakistani sub Hangor torpedoed the INS Khukri during the 1971 India-Pakistan war. An accompanying Indian ship fled instead of returning fire. But many involved received awards for gallantry rather than court martials for dereliction of duty.

… a Pakistani submarine torpedoed and sank the Khukri on the night of December 9, 1971. It is the single biggest wartime casualty of independent India. There was never a court of inquiry to find out if anyone was responsible for the ship going down.

… in their last moments some 250 officers and sailors of the Khukri were abandoned by INS Kirpan, an accompanying naval ship that should have carried out an immediate counterattack250 sailors were abandoned by an accompanying naval ship . It also reveals that the navy’s claim that it hunted and sank the Pakistani submarine a few hours later to be false. The Hangor returned to Karachi harbour safely…

“The Khukri, in company with another A/S (anti-submarine) ship Kirpan, was torpedoed and sunk without even an engagement with the enemy. Eighteen officers and 176 sailors perished with the Khukri. Both the COs deserved to be punished, but the higher authorities gave them gallantry awards. INS Khukri and INS Kirpan violated every principle of A/S doctrine for hunter killer operations…” [Link]

If true, this revisionism may be linked to a military and civilian culture which gives greater weight to saving face than fixing problems.

… It also raises uncomfortable questions about numerous gallantry awards given out by the government to many involved in the incident. [Link]

It reminds me of the Pat Tillman friendly fire cover-up by the U.S. Army Rangers:

… the military’s top commanders were covering up the truth to protect their image… Although “soldiers on the scene said they were immediately sure Tillman was killed by a barrage of American bullets,” according to the Post, and “a new Army report on the death shows that top Army officials, including the theater commander, Gen. John P. Abizaid, were told that Tillman’s death was fratricide days before the service,” Army officials decided not to inform Tillman’s family or the public until weeks after the memorial…

“The fact that he was the ultimate team player and he watched his own men kill him is absolutely heartbreaking and tragic,” Tillman’s mother, Mary, told the Post. “The fact that they lied about it afterward is disgusting..”

The soldiers on the ground said they burned Tillman’s bullet-riddled uniform and body armor, the Post reported, because they considered them a biohazard, and because, as one said, “we knew at the time, based on taking the pictures and walking around it, it was a fratricide…” [Link]

There are also obvious parallels to the plot of Rang De Basanti.

Update: One survivor says the Khukri was not on alert:

Bhushan’s claim is corroborated by one of the survivors of INS Khukri. Chanchal Singh Gill, who had just joined the ship and had a miraculous escape because he was on duty at the time of attack, says the ship was not on Action Station mode.

“That caused the death of so many people,” he told DNA. “The sailors of Khukri were not even wearing life jackets, which is mandatory during Action Stations…” [Link]

The original investigator says the Khukri was not prepared to fight submarines:

“The Western Naval Command headquarters under the then Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Vice Admiral SN Kohli, gave permission to Khukri to mount a modification kit on its sonar… The modification kit would have imposed serious limitations on the anti-submarine capability of Khukri…” [Link]

But he also lays blame on its accompanying ship, the Kirpan:

“In accordance with the normal practice, [the] Kirpan should have immediately carried out an emergency attack. A/S (anti-submarine) ships are fitted with versatile projectile launchers, capable of firing clusters of high explosive projectiles, which covered large area. Launchers could fire over wide arc even ahead at high speeds, under rapid alteration of courses… After the emergency attack Kirpan should have located the enemy submarine and carried out relentless deliberate attacks till the submarine was destroyed.”

The official history presented in the ‘Transition to Triumph’ says that after firing a few salvos at the submarine Kirpan’s “mortars went non-operational”. [Link]