This was a post a long time coming. Not because it contains some scoop on current events – just that after Vinod invited me, and then checking with the rest of the Mutiny, I wanted to be sure that whatever I eventually wrote would be timely. So with time running out, I sat down to post on the unintended consequences of a higher profile for brown folks in the U.S. Most of the focus will be on Indian-Americans specifically, because that is what I am more familiar with. But, in past postings, one idea that has often been tossed about is that IA’s should adopt the stance of more prominent minority groups to garner more attention to its own causes. However, on of the advantages of being a relatively more recent arrival is that you get to learn the consequences of earlier methods – both planned and unintended.
Last week, I received my copy of The Israel Lobby, a book by John Mearsheimer (University of Chicago) and Stephen Walt (Harvard) that argues domestic lobbying, rather than strategic concerns, shape American policy in the Middle East. They first published their thoughts in a shorter essay version that was published in the London Review of Books back in March 2006 – an essay that received both praise and criticism. Without going too deep into the book (since this blog is focused on South Asian matters), the authors do make a reference to Indian Americans. On page 11, they write, “… Indian Americans have rallied to support the recent security treaty and nuclear cooperation agreement.” The role of Indian-Americans in shaping policy was also touched upon by Edward Luce in his book In Spite of the Gods, who wrote about, “… the almost 2 million two million people of Indian origin based in the United States had become a strong new voice in U.S. politics.” (page 278).
How does this relate to South Asia? Well, many ethnic groups use the Jewish model as something to structure their own lobbying efforts. But becoming too dominant in a region where America has different, sometimes conflicting interests, would harm both the U.S. and India. Secondly, in order to wield influence effectively, it is sometimes necessary to cut off internal debate, so as to present a more united front to Congress. In the case of the Israel Lobby, M&W argue the viewpoint it presents does not accurately reflect the varied opinion of Jewish voters in the U.S. So, an Indian lobby wishing to emulate groups like AIPAC or the ADL may wind up silencing dissenting voices that should be heard.
For example, after the attack on India’s parliament in December 2001, there was plenty of domestic pressure on the government in New Delhi to strike back, if not at Pakistan directly, then at a minimum some terrorist training camps in the Pakistani portion of Kashmir. If there existed an Indian lobby that focused solely on Pakistani-sponsored terrorism, which was as dominant as the Israeli lobby, you had the risk that the U.S. would not have tried to restrain India, thereby making a bad situation even worse. Instead, the U.S. managed to pull India and Pakistan back from the brink. Arguably, Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent was a more immediate reason that India did not strike, as discussed in Sumit Ganguly’s and Devin Hagerty’s Fearful Symmetry, but lack of domestic pressure politics allowed the Bush Administration to approach the crisis with a greater leeway than it has in the Mideast. The Bush Administration was able to offer enough incentives to both Islamabad and New Delhi to cool down the rhetoric. In Pakistan’s case, it was being designated a major non-NATO ally, a status enjoyed by South Korea and Australia. In India’s case, it was the nuclear deal. Another calming factor was now that India is “back-office to the world”, it had more to lose by going to war.
In contrast, when the Democratic-controlled Congress drafted spending bills for the Iraq war, it withdrew a section that would have required the President to seek Congressional authority before it undertook any military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities. AIPAC put tremendous pressure on House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, and that portion of the bill was dropped. For an administration that is stuck in Iraq, allowing it the freedom to bomb Iran does not promote stability in the region or Israeli security.
While Indian American lobbying efforts will probably increase in the coming years, it seems that Indo-American relations will proceed along two tracks. In matters of regional security, lobbying efforts will take a back seat to old fashioned self-interest, by both India and the U.S. The increased military cooperation between India and the U.S. seems more focused on regional stability and not against any one country. For American hawks that worry about a rising China and see India as a counterweight, keep in mind that the level of trade between India and China is increasing rapidly. Indians are not likely to be foot soldiers for American adventurism in the region, but having been beaten by China once on the battlefield in 1962, and knowing that Pakistan’s nukes came with a Made in China sticker on it – India is not going to let China dictate terms. A partnership with America helps in that effort.
The second track - the economic one - is probably where lobbying by Indian Americans will be more prominent. Whether it is giving campaign contributions, or sending strongly worded complaints when candidates put their foot in their mouths, such as Obama’s camp did a couple of weeks ago - it is in the economic arena that Indian American efforts will yield results more quickly.
This is fine by me - a nation’s security policy should put its own interests first, and not worry about immigrant lobbies or, in India’s case, diasporic communities which advocate taking an extreme position, but not risking anything themselves.
