By now, most people have probably heard about the huge Satyam scandal, where the company’s founder and chairman, Ramalinga Raju, has taken responsibility for massive fraud in reporting the company’s earnings, profits, and cash balance. Satyam, one of India’s largest consulting and IT companies, has admitted it claimed $1 billion in assets that simply did not exist for just one three month period in 2008. The company is now facing the abyss, as its share prices are evaporating, and clients are starting to defect to rivals (including IBM and Accenture). Satyam currently employs 53,000 people.
As background, Reuters has an informative story on the status of Ramalinga Raju as a symbol of Hyderabad as a new IT hub (“Cyberabad”) and the whole, now deeply tarnished “India Shining” mythology.
And that’s not all. Two American legal firms are filing lawsuits against Satyam, claiming fraud. Distressingly, PriceWaterhouse Coopers, the accounting firm that signed off on Satyam’s accounting practices for years, never detected the fraud.
What went wrong? Salil Tripathi has a provocative Op-Ed at the Wall Street Journal, where he addresses the aspects of Indian business culture that enabled this to happen. For Tripathi, one of the key factors in Satyam’s case is the clan-like structure of Satyam’s upper management and Board of Directors, which are heavily populated by relatives and close friends of the chairman:
What distinguishes a listed company from other forms of business is the separation of ownership from management. As in other countries, some Indian companies have boards made up of friends, if not the family, of the entrepreneur who started the firm. Often, senior management positions are also held by members of the family. Transactions between related parties are not at all rare, and when they occur, the information is not disclosed clearly.
All these warning signs were missed in the case of Satyam, which decided to invest in two real-estate companies related to the Raju family. The board, which included Krishna Palepu, a Harvard Business School professor and a corporate governance expert, and Vinod Dham, regarded as one of the minds behind the Pentium chip at Intel, agreed. The deal fell through when institutional investors protested. Credit the greater transparency economic reforms have brought about in India, with external investors asking hard questions, and the media scrutinizing companies thoroughly. Markets did their job quickly; relief from courts would have taken longer. (link)
Despite the probable collusion of members of the Board of Directors and other members of Senior Management at Satyam in the fraud (it seems hard to imagine that Raju did all this without anyone knowing about it), for Tripathi, the solution is not new laws or tighter regulation:
But good governance requires vigilance by the board. India will need more of that. Institutional investors and the media will have to scrutinize companies more deeply. None of that necessarily requires new law. Indian corporate law is mature. India should take a look at what happened in the U.S. after the Sarbanes-Oxley law of 2002 before it decides to bring back some of its old red tape. (link)
Tripathi is referring to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was instituted in the U.S. after the Enron scandal to strengthen the integrity of corporate accounting practices. I am not sure I agree with Tripathi that new regulations are not required (it seems like the problem he’s describing is exactly the kind of thing carefully written regulations can address), though I admittedly don’t know much about the problems Sarbanes-Oxley has created for American businesses.
What do people think? Tripathi’s article is helpful, though I’m a little confused on some points: aren’t there conflict-of-interest types of restrictions for Boards of Directors in western countries? (In the first passage I quoted, Tripathi suggests in-bred management/accounting/governance structures like Satyam’s are not unique to India.) Shouldn’t some such restrictions be there?
We will probably find out more about how this fraud was perpetuated in the coming weeks, which will clarify what legal reforms are necessary. It is probably too early to say, as confidently as Tripathi does here, that nothing is really wrong.




